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Abstract 
 
 
 
 
 
Using a new dataset, we analyze four years of political protest events in US state capitals, 
in order to specify the processes and possibilities for collective action at the state level.  
Drawing from resource mobilization/political process theory, we test hypotheses 
regarding density of activist communities, political culture, social capital, administrative 
capacities, and political processes in affecting the number of protests, rallies, and 
demonstrations directed at state government.  We find that the most important factors 
include the density of contentious communities of individuals (specifically university 
students), political culture, Democratic Party control of government, and the option to use 
direct legislation (a negative effect), while administrative capacity, generalized social 
capital, and party competition have no effects.  We also find strong positive baseline 
effects for the population size of the state, the relative importance of the capital compared 
to other cities, and urbanization.  We argue that these findings illustrate how aggregate 
levels of state-level political protest arise out of collective action processes and the 
mobilization of small groups, as mediated through stable cultural repertoires of political 
tactics and moderated by certain political opportunities and processes.   
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State-Directed Political Protest in US Capital Cities: 1998-2001 
By 
Bayliss J. Camp and Matthew Kaliner 
 
 
“Teachers mass at the Capitol, heckle school chief" 
A crowd of impatient teachers including several hundred from Clark County rallied at the 
Capitol on Saturday, shouting their demand for a 15 percent pay boost and grumbling at 
recent comments from schools chief Terry Bergeson, Gov. Gary Locke and key 
lawmakers that the demand can’t be met this year.” 
   The Columbian (Vancouver, WA), Pg. A1, 4/18/99 
 
“Protesters crash conference, send governor fleeing; Upset about welfare reform, they 
pound on car as he leaves" 
Several hundred ACORN protesters upset about Arkansas welfare reform marched into a 
Little Rock hotel meeting room where Gov. Mike Huckabee was to give a civil rights 
speech Tuesday, shouted at him and chased him offstage before he could speak.  
Attempts to calm the protesters failed, and four Arkansas State Police troopers whisked 
Huckabee offstage and out of the room through a side door…  About a dozen ACORN 
protesters followed. A few jumped on Huckabee's car and pounded on it as two people 
stood in front of it to block the governor's departure. The protesters moved when 
plainclothes troopers approached.” 
The Arkansas Democrat-Gazette (Little Rock, AR), 4/29/98 
 
4 
“Protesters storm Capitol over income tax; lawmakers cut budget, go home 
The Legislature passed a budget with no new revenue and abandoned plans for an income 
tax Thursday night after protesters stormed the Capitol, breaking windows and chanting 
"No New Taxes!"  State troopers locked the doors to the Capitol after hundreds of 
protesters got out of control - banging on the chamber doors, breaking office windows 
with their fists and accosting lawmakers as they made their way down the statehouse 
hallways with police escorts.  One demonstrator outside the Capitol hurled a rock through 
the window of Gov. Don Sundquist's office. The governor was not there at the time.  A 
state employee trying to lock a side door to the Capitol injured his hand as the weight of 
the crowd pushed against him.  
   AP State and Regional Wire, BC cycle (Nashville, TN), 7/12/01 
 
“Protesters in Harrisburg seek mining moratorium 
Tri-State Citizens Mining Network, a grassroots citizens group, has asked the state to 
impose a moratorium on full extraction mining…Four dozen network members traveled 
to Harrisburg on Tuesday to ask for the moratorium.  There they joined a rally in the 
Capitol Rotunda with other environmental groups from across the state.  Two hundred 
people protested current environmental policies.  They displayed a dummy depicting 
Gov. Ridge, suit pockets stuffed with hundred-dollar bills.”  
   Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, Pg. W1, 5/2/98 
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Introduction 
 
The four examples listed above illustrate some of the colorful tactics that diverse social 
movements and interest organizations use when attempting to effect political change.  
They include groups that normally have access to the channels of political access 
(teachers unions), and groups specifically formed to represent the underserved (the 
Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now, or ACORN).  They represent 
both classic, and accepted, forms of political demonstration (a rally, a satirical effigy of 
an elected leader), as well as threatening and disruptive actions that border on riot.  But 
all are making substantive claims upon elected officials of either the executive or 
legislative branches of their state governments.  In capital cities across the United States, 
groups regularly engage in protests and demonstrations as part of their repertoire of 
political tactics.  However, one can note a wide spectrum in the extent to which capitols 
experience these mass gatherings.  What explains the relative contentiousness or 
quiescence of state-level politics in the United States?  Under what kinds of political 
structures and in what social contexts do we see activists and interest organizations 
(Burstein 1998) using rallies, demonstrations, and other forms of collective action to 
further their political goals?  In other words, what are the relevant factors that limit or 
encourage political actors to use contentious, demonstrative, possibly disruptive tactics at 
the state level?   
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Using a new dataset for a recent time period (1998-2001), we test a number of theories in 
the social movements literature by constructing a model of political contentiousness at 
the state government level.  We test hypotheses on the causal importance of the density of 
activist communities, political culture, social capital, administrative capacities, and 
political processes.  We find that the most important positive factors include the 
presence/density of contentious communities of individuals (specifically university 
students), political culture (Elazar 1972), and control of government by the Democratic 
Party, while administrative capacities and party competition have no effects.  The option 
to use direct legislation has a surprising negative effect, and thus does not appear to 
encourage new, “outsider,” actors to engage the political process, at least not through 
contentious means.  We also find a strong positive baseline effect for the population size 
of the state and urbanization, which we interpret as reflecting basic collective action 
processes.   
 
We argue that these findings illustrate how aggregate levels of state-level political protest 
arise out of collective action processes, as mediated through cultural traditions of political 
engagement and certain specific political processes.  Domestic political protest in the US 
thus involves the mobilization of small groups, informed by stable repertoires of political 
tactics, but heavily moderated by available political opportunities, as measured by which 
political party is in power.  We discuss in our conclusions how these findings bear upon 
our understanding of the political process theory of social movements (Tilly 1978; 
McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996; McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001) 
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Existing Models and Hypotheses 
 
Sociologists of social movements have long been interested in protest as a social 
phenomenon (see Olzak 1989; Oliver 1993; Gamson 1990; Tarrow 1988; McAdam, 
Tarrow, and Tilly 2001 for general treatments of protest and other forms of collective 
action).  This literature is quite large, with researchers treating many facets of public 
collective action.  While we already possess an excellent understanding of riots, protests, 
and demonstrations at the municipal level (Eisinger 1973; Olzak 1987), as well as the 
models to predict collective events at the national level (Kriesi, et al. 1995; Jenkins and 
Schock 1992; Kitschelt 1986) our knowledge of state-level political contention in the 
United States is lacking.  In analyzing this dataset, we hope to define more closely the 
extent to which contentious collective political action rests upon elements of the 
population, such as the density of communities of aggrieved and/or mobilizable persons, 
regional variations in political culture, or aggregate levels of social capital; versus the 
configuration of access, as measured by institutional capacity and changing opportunity 
structures, to the political system.  Since the United States operates as a federal political 
structure, with multiple points of access, we see this dataset as an opportunity to conduct 
a sort of natural experiment on multiple dimensions of state variation.  
 
Although a full review of the literature is not possible in this space, we would like to 
focus on the particular question of how researchers have explained different levels or 
rates of protests, riots, demonstrations, and contentious collective action in general, 
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across time and space.  Scholars have identified four key explanatory factors, either 
singly or in combination, as contributing to the level of contentious political action: 
networks (which we discuss here in terms of the presence, or density, of “activist 
communities”), broad cultural repertoires, state institutional capacities, and formal and 
informal relations of political power (which, for shorthand, we refer to as political 
opportunities).  We discuss each of these in turn.   
 
Activist Communities 
Starting with groundbreaking work on the American Civil Rights movement (Morris, 
1981), and extending to work on European movements (Gould, 1990; Tilly 1986; Kriesi 
et al, 1995), scholars have focused on the importance of bounded communities for the 
mobilization of bodies and resources for collective action.  Networks matter in at least 
three ways.  In the first place, aggrieved persons must be connected to one another in 
some way to form the collectivity necessary to mount a protest.  Secondly, the form of 
the connections between people relates directly to the organizational capacity of the 
network to mount sustained collective action (Traugott, 1985).  Thirdly, communities 
form around particular interests and identities, and this relates directly to the grievances 
around which people mobilize (Clemens, 1997) 
 
Hypothesis 1: The presence and density of communities of historically contentious 
political actors will be positively related to the number of protests, rallies, and 
demonstrations in a given state capital.  
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For different reasons, groups such as public university students (Van Dyke 1998; Scott 
and El-Assal, 1969; Wickham-Crowley, 1992), church members (Morris 1981; McAdam 
1982) and public-sector unions, have been historically likely to foment contentious 
political action.  University students are likely to participate in protest for at least two 
reasons.  First, they are among the most “biographically available” members of the 
population, having both the time and the resources to dedicate to political activism.  
Secondly, however, students of all ages are often directly affected by state legislative 
action in the education policy area, an area that includes funding, teachers’ salaries, 
affirmative action, and standardized testing, among others.  Churches, on the other hand, 
form both the most common form of associational membership in America (Putnam 
2000), one of the main sources of individual civic skills (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 
1995) and the wellspring of social movements as diverse as abolitionism, temperance, 
civil right, pro-life, anti-death penalty.  Public sector workers, on the other hand, often 
appear in political protests at US Capitols for the simple reason that they are essentially 
engaging in strikes or contract negotiations with their employer (the government). 
 
Broad Social and Cultural Repertoires 
Closely related to the ideas developed above, Robert Putnam (1993, 2000) has been 
foremost among those scholars developing and working with the idea of social capital.  
Although grounded in specific individual relationships and networks, social capital can 
also be understood as a property of the collective, operating as a powerful mechanism 
underlying the stability and health of democratic governance and participation.  Although 
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contentious, rallies and demonstrations in the United States are a long-standing, and 
usually (although not always, and not everywhere) acceptable form of political 
participation.  Inasmuch as high stocks of social capital encourage all citizens to 
participate in politics, we would naturally expect that those states high in generalized 
social capital would also see more political rallies and demonstrations – both contentious 
and institutionalized (such as political party rallies).  Thus,  
  
Hypothesis 2: States with high levels of social capital should also have high levels 
of political protests and demonstrations.  
 
We specify this hypothesis using Putnam’s Social Capital Index (Putnam 2000).  
Not only must protesting individuals be imbedded in mobilizable networks and 
communities, they must understand the “repertoire of contention” (Tarrow, 1998; Tilly, 
1993) as including protests, rallies, and demonstrations as possible/efficacious forms of 
collective behavior.  In this sense, one might wonder if some states have a history of 
radical action in the capital – a history that feeds on itself and forms part of the stable 
political culture.  In other words, just as there are contentious French (Tilly, 1986), might 
there not also be contentious New Englanders?  While many scholars within political 
science have worked with Daniel Elazar’s (1972) political culture variables, little use has 
been made of them in the social movements literature.  In his view, stable political 
cultures (labeled Individualism, Moralism, and Traditionalism) help to structure the 
forms and processes of political behavior and outcomes.  Traditionalist political cultures 
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involve deference to (elected) elites, while Individualist cultures suspect government 
regulation and action altogether and Moralist cultures encourage government activity, 
particularly in social and economic matters.  At the individual level, Moralist cultures 
encourage political participation and activity of all forms, while Individualist cultures see 
participation as more narrowly a matter of individual costs and gains.  Traditionalist 
polities cede political action to the elite, and so should see lower rates of collective action 
and political engagement.  Thus, we propose the following:  
  
Hypothesis 3: States with Moralist political cultures should exhibit higher rates of 
political protest than Individualist states, and Traditionalist states should exhibit 
the lowest rates of protest.  
 
Although Elazar originally conceived of his political culture as consisting of an 
essentially three-part categorical scheme, Sharkansky (1969) has demonstrated how it can 
also be used as a linear variable, particularly when looking at political participation (as 
we are here).  We thus use Sharkansky’s 9 point scale to measure political culture.  
 
State Capacities 
Moving from explanations focusing on networks/mobilizing structures and relatively 
stable stocks of social capital or cultural repertoires of contention, many scholars have 
focused instead on attributes of the formal and informal rules and relations of politics and 
political processes.  Eisinger (1973), for instance, was one of the first to point to the now-
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familiar U-shaped curve describing the openness of the political structure and protest 
events (in his case, at the municipal level).  While open political systems subsume the 
need for protest (since all or most political actors have access), closed systems foreclose 
it (either because of repression or because actors know that protest won’t lead to policy 
gains or change).  Kitschelt (1986) also, among others, has pointed out the importance 
not just of “input structures” (whether or not the political system is open or closed to new 
actors) but also the importance of “output structures” (how able the government is to put 
new policies into action).  We can extend Kitschelt’s reasoning regarding the policy 
implementation and regulation capacity of states, by specifying somewhat the 
mechanisms through which groups attempt to influence political debate and policy 
outcomes.  Hence, we would expect the size of the state government – the 
professionalization of the legislature, and administrative/budgetary capacity – to 
encourage more claims upon the government.  In other words, as a government can do 
more, the electorate should expect more from it, and so make more claims upon it.  With 
more executive and legislative staff, and more bureaucratic agencies to deal with, we 
expect that (given the relative openness of the American political system) interest 
organizations in high-capacity states will engage in more claims-making activities of all 
kinds.  Although this point seems obvious when it comes to lobbying, we expect similar 
results even with contentious political action.  Thus: 
 
Hypothesis 4: States with high institutional capacity should have higher rates of 
political protest than those with low capacity.  
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We specify this hypothesis by using an index of professionalization of the legislative 
branch of government.  To test the importance of output structures, we also examine the 
importance of the relative size of the state budget. 
 
Political Opportunities  
Although all US states are relatively open politically (particularly in the post-Civil Rights 
era), one major difference across states comes in the presence of the direct legislation 
mechanism (popular initiatives and referenda).  As argued since the progressive era 
(Cronin, 1989), direct legislation opens up the policy-making process in a substantial 
manner.  By doing so, direct legislation provides aggrieved and interested political actors 
with another channel of influence to affect the policy-making process.  There is 
substantial evidence that by doing so, direct legislation increases the number of lobbying 
groups (Boehmke in press, Camp 2001).  By increasing the number of interest 
organizations making claims on state government, we would expect that political protest 
would increase in a commensurate manner, in part because of movement-
countermovement interactions (Meyer and Staggenborg, 1996), but also because of the 
dynamics of increased pluralism.  We thus expect that: 
  
Hypothesis 5: States with direct legislation mechanisms (initiatives and popular 
referenda) will have higher levels of protest events than states without direct 
legislation. 
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In addition to institutional openness and state capacity, scholars have often pointed to the 
importance of political alignments.  In general, the relationship between political elites 
and activists depends upon the issue at hand – Kriesi et al (1995) find that activists 
generally tone down disruptive tactics when allies are in control of the government.  
While one might suppose that those engaging in protest are generally allied with the left 
(the Democratic party), a brief survey of the qualitative evidence shows a healthy 
presence of issues close to the traditional core of the Republican party (e.g., pro-life 
demonstrations, or anti-tax rallies).  Assuming that protest at the state level is not 
primarily an activity of the political left, we focus instead on a corollary hypothesis, 
namely that we should expect protest to increase with electoral competitiveness.  This 
could be true for one of two reasons: either political parties are (directly or indirectly) 
encouraging demonstrations as part of their electoral mobilization strategy, or, social 
movement organizations are using moments of divided power to capture the attention 
(and favor) of elected officials through demonstrations (Tarrow, 1998).  Thus: 
 
Hypothesis 6: States showing close electoral competition should show high levels 
of protest.  
 
We specify this using the Ranney indices of party competition and control (Gray and 
Jacobs 1996).   
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Finally, since there is a strong and diverse research tradition showing effects for 
population size and heterogeneity (Smelser, 1963; Scott and El-Assal, 1969; Eisinger 
1973; Dahl, 1961) we include controls for the size of the state, the size of the capital city, 
and the percentage of the population living in urban areas, all of which we expect to 
increase the number of political protests.  
 
In developing a full model using elements of each of these hypotheses, we argue that the 
number of protests experienced by a particular polity is a product of a combination of 
factors: certain essentially Durkheimian characteristics of the population as a whole (the 
sheer size of the state, urbanization, and the social capital which its population possesses 
in the aggregate) which bear upon the possibilities for gathering a committed group of 
activists together in order to mount a protest (Olson, 1965).  Along with this, we stress 
the importance of the presence and density of certain classes of mobilizable individuals, 
or activist communities, who draw upon accepted repertoires of contention and take 
advantage of specific transitory political opportunities.  As we show in our analysis, and 
contrary to our expectations, the formal institutional mechanisms of the state (legislative 
professionalization and budgetary capacity), have no effect on the level of protest, once 
we control for other factors.  The option to use direct legislation, on the other hand, has a 
negative effect, suggesting that direct democracy does not in fact encourage political 
outsiders to engage issues, at least not contentiously.  We discuss the implications of this 
latter finding further in our conclusions.  
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Methods 
 
Using Lexis-Nexis, we did full text “guided” searches on the US News database.  Our 
search string used the name of the capital city and the following terms to narrow the 
search: (statehouse or capit*l) and (rall! or protest! or demonstrat!), with “*” substituting 
for one letter, and “!” substituting for any number of letters.  This resulted in a wide 
number of hits, typically 10-20 times the final number of events included in the dataset.  
For a very few select states (North Carolina, Pennsylvania, and Michigan), we also used 
the Dow Jones Interactive archive (with the identical search string) to supplement state 
capital coverage.  Coders included all events that took place in the capital city and were 
directed toward a state-level issue or government entity.  We decided to search only on 
the capital city to confine our newspaper search as closely as possible to the universe of 
collective events targeted at the state polity.  Although protests and demonstrations 
targeting the state government certainly occur in cities other than the state capital, we 
assumed that the vast majority of political demonstrations take place at the physical and 
symbolic seat of power.  We assumed further that these non-capital city events would be 
significantly harder to find in the “noise” of other collective actions.  As a partial test of 
these assumptions, we constructed a dummy variable (described in further detail below) 
measuring the relative “importance” of the capital relative to other cities in the state.  
Briefly, our analysis showed that including the logged population of the capital city as a 
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control variable captures some of what some call the “Sacramento effect,”1 but that there 
do appear to be additive effects to a capital being the most important city in the state.  
 
Events in cities other than the capital were dropped, as were events on national issues 
(e.g., foreign policy, peace) and political party rallies.2  Events had to include at least 10 
persons, and events on the same issue had to be separated by at least 24 hours to be 
counted separately.  We chose to focus our search on the 1998-2001 period only because 
we knew that all of the newspapers included in the database went back at least that far 
(including the AP service).  For the period 1998-2001, there were, on average, 46.8 
protest events in each capital city (SD of 33.2).  The most quiescent state we found was 
Delaware (six events in Dover) while the most contentious was Massachusetts (168 
events in Boston).  See Appendix A for a list of the number of protests in all 50 states 
 
Following the suggestions of previous authors (Olzak, 1989; Maney and Oliver, 2001), 
we include controls for the number of papers available for each state, and a dummy 
variable for whether or not Lexis-Nexis uses the paper for the capital city.  The latter, as 
it turns out, are highly powerful predictors, indicating the importance of media coverage 
in shaping our “view” of the number of protests in a particular state.  Indeed, nearly 43% 
                                                 
1 The name comes derives from the argument that, in states where the capital is relatively 
unimportant or small in comparison to other cities, protests will happen in larger, more 
important cities (such as, in the case of California, Los Angeles and San Francisco).  
2 Certain third-party collective actions (e.g., by the state Green Party, or the Reform 
Party) focus on particular issues rather than on the election of a party candidate.  These 
events (which were most often on campaign finance reform or term limits) were included 
in the analysis.  
18 
of the variance can be explained by our methodological controls.  All states have at least 
the AP, but a few (e.g., Vermont, South Dakota, Mississippi, and Montana) have no news 
services other than the AP listed; we have included these here but would note that we 
believe the estimates of event counts in these states are biased downward (as indicated by 
the predictive strength of the control variables).  While we take this as a precautionary 
note regarding the ultimate utility of Lexis-Nexis as a search engine, particularly in light 
of the recent court decision in Tasini et al. vs. New York Times et al.3, we are confident 
that our results provide significant added value to our understanding of the patterns of 
protest and collective action in US states.   
 
In order to test some of the hypotheses laid out above, we developed the following 
variables:  
Population Effects: 
1.) Log of the state’s population, 2000 
2.) Log of the population of the capital city, 2000 
3.) Percentage of the state’s population living in census-defined urban areas (50,000 
or more) 
                                                 
3 This court decision affected the reprintability of stories and collection of royalties 
therefrom by certain freelance journalists.  In the aftermath of this decision, search 
engines such as Lexis have been gradually cleaning their archives.  This indicates that 
these archives are not 100% stable, and may affect at the margins the exact 
reproducibility of this study.  However, as political protests are almost always the subject 
of multiple stories in newspapers, by different authors, we do not believe this to be a 
significant problem.  
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4.) Dummy for “Sacramento effect.”  Coded 1 of there is another city, larger than the 
capital, that comprises more than 10% of the population of the state, coded 0 
otherwise.  
(source for all of the above: Census 2000) 
Networks: 
1.) Number of university students enrolled at colleges in the capitol city in 1999.4   
2.) Percentage of the public labor force (meaning government workers) that was 
unionized in 1998.5   
3.) Churches/1000 population, 1990 (the most recent year available).6 
Broad Socio-Cultural Repertoires: 
1.) Political Culture.  Following Sharkansy’s (1969) transformation of Elazar’s 
(1972) political culture variables, we use a 9 point linear scale, with Moralist 
states coded closer to one and Traditionalist states approaching nine.   
2.) Social Capital.  Here we used Robert Putnam’s (2000) Social Capital Index.   
State Capacities: 
                                                 
4 Source: Barron’s Profiles of American Colleges: 2001.  Since there is inconsistent 
evidence that students at public universities protest more than those at private colleges, 
we chose to use the total number of undergraduates, both public and private.  Although 
Scott and El-Assal argue for the importance of large “multiversities” in producing 
protest, see Van Dyke (1998) for evidence that public universities are less likely to 
produce activism than private schools.  In separate analyses (not shown; available upon 
request), we find evidence to support Van Dyke’s thesis.   
5 Source: Current Population Survey, Feb. 1998.  We also ran a regression using the 
unionized percentage of the total labor force.  The results were, surprisingly, in a negative 
direction and not significant.  
6 Source: American Religion Data Archive 
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1.) Legislative Professionalization.  This was operationalized as a series of three 
dummy variables, with citizen legislatures as the omitted category.7  
2.)  State Budget per capita.8  This measure is of the 1998 budget (the most recent  
      data available) divided by the population in 2000.   
Political Processes: 
1.) Direct Legislation.  We ran two different formulations of this variable.  First, we 
tested a simple dummy variable for whether or not a state allows for direct 
legislation.  Second, we used the count of the number of ballot initiatives in each 
state (1978-1996), with all non-initiative states coded as zero.9  
 2.) In order to measure Democratic Party control, we used the Ranney index (as 
            described in Gray and Jacobs, 1996).  Party competition was calculated using the 
folded Ranney Index.  Both measures were calculated by the authors using 
election data for the 1995-2000 period.10  
Controls: 
                                                 
7 Source: Gray and Jacobs (1996) 
8 Source: Ibid.  
9 Source: DuBois and Feeney (1998) 
10 Sources of election data: The Book of the States (various years) and Scammon et al 
(2000).  The Ranney Index combines the average Democratic vote for governor, the 
average number of seats held by Democrats in the lower house for all terms, the average 
number of seats held by Democrats in the lower house for all terms, and the average 
number of seats for all offices (Gubernatorial, lower house, and upper house) held by 
Democrats in all terms.  Thus low scores reflect Republican control and high scores 
reflect Democratic control.  The folded Ranney index is calculated by the formula 1 - | 
0.5 – Ranney Index|.  This gives a number between 0.5 and 1, with 0.5 reflecting perfect 
monopoly by one of the two parties and 1 reflecting evenly split control of the legislative 
and gubernatorial branches of government.  Because Nebraska has a nonpartisan 
unicameral legislature, the Ranney index was calculated using only the gubernatorial 
vote.  
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1.) Number of newspapers (not including the AP) carried for each state by Lexis-
Nexis 
2.) Dummy variable for capital city coverage.  1 if Lexis-Nexis or Dow Jones carried 
the paper, 0 otherwise.  
 
We then tested each of these variables in a series of partial poisson regression models, 
after which we constructed a full model, which we discuss below.  
 
Findings 
See Tables 1 and 3 for our partial regressions and a table of means and correlations.  See 
Table 2 for our full model.  In the discussion below, our interpretations of the size and 
importance of effects refers to the coefficients in Table 2.   
 
We would turn the readers’ attention first, however, to Appendix A, where we show the 
number of protests in each state normalized by population. Here we find relatively clear 
regional patterns: the Rocky Mountains, the Plain States, and New England all stand out 
as high protest regions.  At least one of the exceptions to these patterns is relatively easy 
to explain:  South Carolina stands out among Southern states as being “too high” – this in 
part derives from a rather idiosyncratic series of protest events during this period having 
to do with the flying of the Confederate flag over the statehouse.  These overall 
geographic patterns suggest two possible explanations.  First, this pattern may arise from 
there being a certain predictable “set” of protests that occur relatively regularly in all state 
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capitols.  Qualitatively, coders remarked upon the seeming ubiquity of death penalty 
vigils, pro-life rallies, and teacher strikes in all states.11  As all states experience at least 
these three species of protest events, low-population states (such as in the Rocky 
Mountains and the northern Plains States) will show a higher density of protest events.  In 
all of our models this may account for the strength of the variable measuring logged 
population.  Alternatively (or in conjunction with this explanation), we may be seeing an 
irreducibly regional pattern of politics, relying upon a theory of contentious New 
Englanders and Rocky Mountainers.  As we show in our results below, much of this 
regionalism can be explained via the Sharansky/Elazar index, indicating that the strongly 
regional patterns one can note here may in part be a function of the slight correspondence 
between regionalism and state political cultures.  
 
Starting with the variables measuring population effects, we see strong positive effects 
for the logged population of the state and percent living in urban areas.  We interpret this 
as a basic reflection of the collective action processes that underlie political protest: with 
more people in a state, and more people living in dense urban communities, it becomes 
easier to collect a group of individuals together to protest at the statehouse.  However, the 
“Sacramento effect” variable reflects a slightly different process.  Although crude, our 
measure here attempts to capture the effect of a capitol city playing “second fiddle” to 
larger, more important cities in the state.  Examples of such states include Alaska, 
                                                 
11 In further analysis of these data, we intend to present a systematic picture of the actors  
and issues involved in these protest events.  See conclusion. 
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California, or Illinois, while the converse grouping includes both states where the capital 
is the largest city (e.g., Massachusetts, Georgia, Arkansas), and states where no particular 
city dominates the state in terms of population (e.g., North Carolina, New Jersey, Iowa).  
This suggests that the symbolic importance of a capitol city as the primary cite of 
political contention does in fact depend upon the size and importance of the city itself.  
Although we do not here measure protests in cities other than capitals (which would be 
necessary to unpack more precisely this effect), this finding alone points to the possible 
decentralization of state-directed political contention in America, and an intriguing 
avenue for further research.  
 
There was only one significant measure of the density of communities of interest: we see 
a modest positive effect for public university student networks.  For every 16,000 
undergraduate students (or one standard deviation) living and studying in the capital, we 
can expect a 1/8 increase in the number of protests.  In other words, adding a medium-
sized university to the capital city will, on average and holding all other variables at their 
mean, result in an additional political protest every eight months.  Although in our partial 
model we see a similar effect for the density of public sector unions, with an 11.3% 
increase in the number of protests (about one per year) for every standard deviation 
change in the unionization rate, this effect drops out in the final model.  These groups are 
particularly likely to protest for two separate, but overlapping, reasons.  While public 
sector unions are, in effect, engaging in contentious contract negotiations with their 
employer, university students are the universally available “bodies” for protests of all 
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kinds.  Moreover, however, education policy is also one of the continuously important 
issue-areas in state politics, and students are often demonstrating on policy changes that 
directly affect them: education funding, teachers’ salaries, standardized testing, 
affirmative action, etc.  In further analysis of these data, we intend to show how students 
of all ages (secondary and college) are the modal actor in protest events across the US.  
 
In examining culture, Elazar’s measure of political culture shows significant effects.  In 
comparison to other variables, a shift from one mode to another (say, from a 
Traditionalist such as Tennessee to an Individualist state such as Indiana) involves a 
change of about 18% in the number of protests. In keeping with prior research in political 
science, we find that political culture, although a somewhat imprecise measure, has 
enduring power for predicting patterns of state political behavior in the US.  Indeed, 
although this effect is somewhat smaller than some of the others discussed here (such as 
population size, or Democratic Party control), in regressions not shown (available upon 
request), we find that this variable’s effects underlies others which appear significant in 
the partial regressions shown in Table 1.  This includes the effects of public sector 
unionization and social capital.  
 
In the partial model shown in Table 1, Putnam’s social capital index appears at first to 
have a large and significant effect on the distribution of protests across states.  However, 
in our final model, social capital’s effects are absorbed by political culture (although note 
that these measures are quite correlated (r = -.67).  What does this suggest?  Partly, we 
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believe, it sheds light on a certain puzzle regarding the importance of social networks in 
solving collective action problems at different levels of aggregation.  Putnam and others 
have clearly shown the importance of state- and nation-wide stocks of social capital to the 
functioning efficiency of democratic governance.  However, political protest (as we have 
measured it here) would appear to depend more upon the sheer number of available 
bodies (particularly biographically available college students), and the political traditions 
of a given state. 
 
When looking at the size and configuration of the state government, the effects of 
legislative professionalization and budgetary capacity are not significant in the final 
model.  Given previous research using cross-national comparisons we interpret this 
finding as indicating that, at least among US states, differences in formal channels of 
access and the size of state government are too small to have any effect on the level of 
political protest during this period.   
 
When looking at political processes, however, the results were mixed, and not entirely 
expected.  Coders did find qualitative evidence in the data supporting the common view 
that, by bringing contentious issues to the forefront of public life, direct legislation opens 
up new arenas of conflict between various citizen groups.  However, the pure presence of 
the direct legislation mechanism appears in fact to depress protest (by about 13%), once 
all other effects are controlled for.  Given other qualitative findings on specific 
movements (Camp 2002; Gamble 1997; Haider-Markel and Meyer 1996; Jackman 1994), 
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as well as quantitative work (Boehmke, forthcoming) this finding lends support to the 
argument developed by Camp (2001) that the presence of DL shifts movement tactics 
away from protest, and far from encouraging polity “outsiders” to make claims upon 
government, direct legislation encourages institutionalization: namely legislative 
lobbying by groups already endowed with access.   
 
Also surprising was the importance of Democratic Party control, particularly given the 
lack of significance for the competition variable (which is not simply a measure of the 
average competitiveness of elections, but properly speaking a comprehensive measure of 
divided government).  In comparative terms, this variable shows that for every standard 
deviation increase (say, from an evenly divided government to one that was controlled by 
the Democrats with a 12 seat majority in a hundred-person Statehouse), protests increase 
by approximately 20%.  Two authors would suggest two interpretations.  First, the time 
period under consideration covers the closing years of the Clinton Presidency, as well as 
one of the most contentious Presidential elections in modern history.  Thus, even though 
our dataset is restricted to purely state-directed protests, the increase we see from 
Democratic party control may thus be a product of certain historical conjunctures, which 
of course must be tested against data from other periods in time.  Secondly, however, this 
effect may be a product of the basic responsiveness of a center-left party to contentious 
political action.  This latter interpretation will be explored in future work, in analysis of 
the issues and actors engaging in these protest actions.  A third possibility, that protest 
and Democratic party control are both a product of a liberal electorate, we tested using 
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mass ideology data from Erikson, Wright, and McIver (1993).  We found no significant 
relationship. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
These results point us toward an interpretation of contentious collective action in the US 
states as arising out of a combination of factors:  
a) Certain ineluctable Durkheimian properties of large, urbanized states.  In densely 
populated polities, we find a significant increase in the number of protests, indicating 
most directly the importance having a number of people available to mount a collective 
action.  
b.) Connected with this, protest depends upon networks of mobilizable activists, most 
particularly near-by college students.  Both of these comments reflect the fact that protest 
is a risky venture, even in a liberal democracy such as the US.  Although the number of 
events involving arrests in our dataset is vanishingly small, they do occur.  This suggests 
that for people to engage in protest they must be relatively assured that (i) others will join 
them in making claims upon the government,12 and (ii) the state will not engage in violent 
repression.   
(c) Stable repertoires of political culture.  As mentioned earlier, while much use has been 
made in political science of Elazar’s notions, little has been said within the social 
                                                 
12 We are grateful to Prof. Robert Putnam for suggesting this interpretation of the evidence.  
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movements literature (in part, perhaps, because it is unclear how replicable his study is 
beyond the United States).  More broadly, these findings indicate that cultural traditions 
of accepted political action and collective behavior interact strongly with the 
demographic and political processes outlined here.  This latter notion has, of course, 
already been well-explored within the social movements literature – we would here 
simply suggest that for understanding domestic US patterns of political action, we needs 
must give critical attention to Elazar’s (admittedly somewhat hazy) definitions and 
categories.  
(d) Specific opportunities for challenging those in power.  In our analysis we find that 
control by the Democratic Party (and not party competition per se) leads to an increase in 
political protest.  As discussed above, these findings are somewhat difficult to interpret, 
although may arise from either historical conjunctures (the Clinton Presidency, the 2000 
election) or a basic receptiveness of the Democratic Party to “outsider” tactics.  Future 
analysis of the issues and actors involved in these protests will help us to unpack this 
finding. .  
 
(e) Finally, as mentioned above, while we find no support for the idea that differences in 
formal administrative capacity have any effect on protest, we do find a negative effect for 
direct democracy (ballot initiatives).  Given other research focusing on international 
comparisons, our results regarding the null effects of bureaucratic capacity may simply 
reflect the relatively small differences across US states compared to other polities.  
However, our findings regarding direct legislation constitute a fundamental critique of the 
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supposed “openness” (or invitational quality) of direct democracy to polity outsiders.  
Since protest is the perquisite of those actors who do not have institutional access, and 
ballot initiatives were ostensibly designed to “open up” the legislative process (Cronin, 
1989), it appears that any connection between direct legislation and increased access is at 
best indirect.   
 
Overall, however, these findings suggest that, at least for the purposes of understanding 
the circumstances under which state-level US political protest arise, the size and formal 
rules of the state polity are less important than who is engaging the political debate, their 
characteristics, and the shifting nature of which party is in power.  Thus, these findings 
lend quantitative support to several streams of more qualitative research in the social 
movements literature, highlighting the importance of the presence and organization of 
aggrieved communities, differences in regional political/cultural repertoires, and the 
political opportunities presented by which party is in power.  In sum, protests are part and 
parcel of large, pluralist democracies (as measured by the powerful effect of population, 
urbanization, and the relative importance of the capital city), but are carried out by 
organized populations of mobilized individuals who carry with them expectations about 
proper political behavior.  Furthermore, protests happen at particular moments – 
presumably when expectations are high regarding possible returns, and protestors expect 
those in power to respond to their demands.  Future work with this dataset will focus on 
the distribution of claims (e.g., redistributive/economic versus social, moral, or 
symbolic), and the distribution of actors.  This work will hopefully help us detail a more 
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precise picture of the universe of actors engaging in political demonstrations, as well as a 
better idea of the kinds of claims that are made through contentious protest events at US 
statehouses.  
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Appendix A: Protests by State, 1998-2001 
State 
# of 
Protests 
Protests 
Per Million State 
# of 
Protests 
Protests Per 
Million 
Alabama 21 5 Montana 21 23 
Alaska 9 14 Nebraska 33 19 
Arizona 24 5 Nevada 10 5 
Arkansas 
24 9 New 
Hampshire 
37 30 
California 94 3 New Jersey 36 4 
Colorado 99 23 New Mexico 62 34 
Connecticut 52 15 New York 133 7 
Delaware 
6 8 North 
Carolina 
56 7 
Florida 68 4 North Dakota 11 17 
Georgia 49 6 Ohio 64 6 
Hawaii 21 17 Oklahoma 42 12 
Idaho 29 22 Oregon 33 10 
Illinois 56 5 Pennsylvania 87 7 
Indiana 47 8 Rhode Island 65 62 
Iowa 
36 12 South 
Carolina 
49 12 
Kansas 31 12 South Dakota 7 9 
Kentucky 13 3 Tennessee 40 7 
Louisiana 37 8 Texas 116 6 
Maine 29 23 Utah 63 28 
Maryland 54 10 Vermont 16 26 
Massachusetts 168 26 Virginia 44 6 
Michigan 38 4 Washington 77 13 
Minnesota 56 11 West Virginia 32 18 
Mississippi 15 5 Wisconsin 80 15 
Missouri 33 6 Wyoming 18 36 
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Appendix B: Table 1 
Table 1: Partial Poisson Regression Models: Population, Mobilization, Repertoires, State Capacity, and Political 
Process Effects on Political Protest in US Capitol Cities, 1998-2001 
           
      
Model 1: 
Baseline 
Effects 
Model 2: 
Mobilizable 
Communities 
Model 3A: 
Political 
Culture 
Model 3B: 
Social 
Capital 
Model 4: 
Capacity 
Model 5A: 
Polity #1 
Model 5B: 
Polity #2 
  
Population Effects  
Log of the State's 
Population, 2000 
.1252*** 
(.0358) 
.1485*** 
(.0366) 
.2280*** 
(.0384) 
.2027*** 
(.0409) 
.0923** 
(.0476) 
.1099*** 
(.0383) 
.1153*** 
(.0450) 
 
  
Log of the Pop. of 
the Capital City 
.0965*** 
(.0239) 
.0592** 
(.0305) 
.1009*** 
(.0238) 
.1076*** 
(.0238) 
.0988*** 
(.0241) 
.0945*** 
(.0247) 
.1050*** 
(.0263) 
 
  
% Living in Urban 
Areas 
.0091*** 
(.0013) 
.0041** 
(.0020) 
.0057*** 
(.0014) 
.0093*** 
(.0014) 
.0082*** 
(.0014) 
.0086*** 
(.0013) 
.0090*** 
(.0014) 
 
  "Sacramento Effect" 
-.1534*** 
(.0508) 
-.1075**    
(.0548) 
-.1871*** 
(.0514) 
-.1349*** 
(.0511) 
-.2008*** 
(.0536) 
-.1693*** 
(.0511) 
-.1473*** 
(.0510) 
 
Mobilizable 
Communities   
# of College 
Students in the 
Capital, 1999   
7.61 e-6*** 
(1.87 e-6)            
  
Percentage Gov't 
Workers Unionized, 
1998  
.0064*** 
(.0014)       
  
Churches/1000 pop., 
1990  
-.0376   
(.0738)       
Socio-Political Repertoires                
Elazar Political 
Culture   Sharkansky Index   
-.0664*** 
(.0098)      
Social Capital  Putnam SC Index       
.1891*** 
(.0325)        
State Capacities                    
  Professionalized     
.2070** 
(.0890)    
Legislative 
Professionalization  Mixed     
.1108* 
(.0647)    
    (Citizen Omitted)                
Budget  
State Budget Per 
Capita, 1998     
4.15 e-5 
(3.56 e-5)    
           
Political Processes                
Polity Model #A  
Dem. Party Control, 
1995-2000      
.4750*** 
(.1878)   
   
Direct Legislation 
Mechanism?      
-.0825* 
(.0475)   
Polity Model #B  
Party 
Competitiveness, 
1995-2000             
-.1512 
(.3552)  
  
# of Initiatives, 
1978-1994       
-.0015 
(.0013)  
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Methdological 
Controls   
# of Papers in Lexis-
Nexis 
.0899*** 
(.0135) 
.0696*** 
(.0138) 
.0690*** 
(.0136) 
.0712*** 
(.0139) 
.0902*** 
(.0143) 
.1012*** 
(.0145) 
.1012*** 
(.0170)  
  
Capital Paper in 
Lexis-Nexis? 
0.4961*** 
(.0428) 
0.4170*** 
(.0462) 
.5050*** 
(.0429) 
.5071*** 
(.0441) 
.5064*** 
(.0450) 
.4742*** 
(.0440) 
.4688*** 
(.0478)  
           
Constant     
-.2263 
(.4788) 
-0.0658 
(.5800) 
-1.2610 
(.4965)*** 
-1.8967 
(.5966)*** 
0.0817 
(.7367) 
-.1603 
(.5154) 
-.0359 
(.5027)  
X-square   744.35*** 802.05*** 789.99*** 718.84*** 755.19*** 755.62*** 745.98***  
Pseudo R-Square     0.5704 0.6146 0.6054 0.5843 0.5787 0.579 0.5717  
           
* P < .10;  ** P < .05;  *** P < .01         
NOTE: All coefficients are unstandardized and logged.          
All models use 50 cases, except for the Social Capital (n=48, HI and AK missing) model (see text)    
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Table 2: Full Poisson Regression Model: Population, Mobilization, Repertoires, State 
Capacity, and Political Process Effects on Political Protest in US Capitol Cities, 1998-
2001 
    
Model 1: 
Community, 
Repertoires, 
Capacity, 
and Process Model 1A 
Population Effects         
  Log of the State's Population, 2000 
.1771*** 
(.0561) 
.2402*** 
(.0403) 
  Log of the Pop. of the Capital City 
.0517    
(.0329)  
  % Living in Urban Areas 
.0039** 
(.0017) 
.0032** 
(.0015) 
  "Sacramento Effect" 
-0.1476** 
(.0602) 
-0.1641*** 
(.0554) 
          
Mobilizable Communities   
  # of College Students in Capitol, 1999 
6.28 e-6*** 
(1.94 e-6) 
7.77 e-6*** 
(1.56 e-6) 
  % Public Workers Unionized, 1998 
-.0024    
(.0025)  
          
Socio-Political Repertoires   
Political Culture   Sharkansky Index 
-.0702*** 
(.0199) 
-0.0849*** 
(.0108) 
Social Capital  Putnam Index 
.0251     
(.0487)  
     
State Capacities         
  Professionalized 
.0195    
(.0989)  
Legislative 
Professionalization  Mixed 
.1484*** 
(.0738)  
  (Citizen Omitted)   
          
Political Processes     
Democratic Party 
Control  Ranney Index 
.8229** 
(.2687) 
1.0006*** 
(.2101) 
Openness   Direct Legislation Mechanism? 
-0.1278*** 
(.0540) 
-0.1245*** 
(.0468) 
          
Methodological 
Controls  # of Papers in Lexis-Nexis 
.0836*** 
(.0156) 
.0738*** 
(.0142) 
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  Capital Paper in Lexis-Nexis? 
.4391*** 
(.0516) 
.4163*** 
(.0469) 
          
Constant   
-.4574    
(.8514) 
-0.5789     
(.5794) 
X-square   793.08*** 846.04*** 
Pseudo R-Square   0.6446 0.6483 
* P < .10;  ** P < .05;  *** P < .01   
     
NOTE: All coefficients are unstandardized and logged.   
Model 1: N = 48 cases (AK and HI missing)   
Model 1A: N = 50 cases   
Predicted values: mean = 46.82 (30.34), min = 12.76, max = 140.92  
 
 
Table 3: Correlations, Means, and Standard Deviations for Dependent and Independent Variables          
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
1.) # of Political 
Protests …                    
2.) Log of State's 
Population, 2000 0.616 …                   
3.) Log of Capital 
City's 
Population, 2000 0.417 0.534 …                  
4.) % of 
Population 
Living in Urban 
Areas 0.582 0.600 0.375 …                 
5.) "Sacramento 
Effect" 0.025 0.021 -0.180 0.037 …                
6.) # of College 
Students, 1999 0.631 0.496 0.645 0.392 -0.240 …               
7.) % Gov't 
Workers 
Unionized, 1998 0.417 0.124 -0.163 0.380 0.121 0.113 …              
8.) Churches per 
10,000 
population -0.502 -0.436 -0.153 -0.767 -0.004 -0.305 -0.537 …             
9.) Sharkansky 
Index -0.149 -0.247 0.209 -0.096 -.1474 0.050 -0.554 0.260 …            
10.) Putnam SC 
Index -0.133 -0.494 -0.399 -0.336 0.051 -0.215 0.228 0.072 -0.674 …           
11.) 
Professionalized 
Legislature 0.525 0.549 0.140 0.436 0.227 0.281 0.547 -0.427 -0.244 -0.080 …          
12.) Mixed 
Legislature -0.097 0.188 0.240 -0.018 -0.118 0.036 -0.490 0.090 0.380 -0.199 -0.442 …         
13.) Citizen 
Legislature -0.327 -0.644 -0.364 -0.337 -0.062 -0.267 0.064 0.225 -0.196 0.272 -0.356 -0.681 …        
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14.) 
Budget/Capita, 
1998 0.100 -0.318 -0.361 -0.085 0.009 -0.047 0.441 -0.050 -0.328 0.305 0.211 -0.341 0.183 …       
15.) Ranney 
Index 0.177 0.151 0.148 0.109 -0.016 0.169 0.145 -0.067 0.422 -0.2815 -0.058 0.231 -0.193 0.073 …      
16.) Presence of 
DL -0.065 -0.104 0.033 -0.013 0.030 -0.103 -0.030 0.087 -0.243 0.145 0.074 -0.129 0.075 -0.099 -0.185 …     
17.) Folded 
Ranney Index 0.094 0.396 -0.003 0.158 -0.0377 0.049 0.009 -0.318 0.121 -0.071 0.088 0.211 -0.292 -0.053 -0.051 -0.229 …    
18.) # of 
Initiatives, 1978-
1994 0.131 0.122 0.098 0.159 0.221 -0.054 0.149 -0.147 -0.349 0.172 0.133 -0.018 -0.090 0.025 -0.023 0.614 -0.036 …   
19.) # of Papers 
in Lexis 0.662 0.667 0.215 0.476 0.209 0.316 0.301 -0.452 -0.057 -0.152 0.510 -0.122 -0.289 -0.085 -0.058 0.097 0.221 0.363 …  
20.) Capital 
Paper in Lexis? 0.410 0.090 0.100 0.143 0.118 0.253 0.064 -0.061 0.022 -0.145 0.180 -0.296 0.162 0.179 0.064 -0.169 -0.174 -0.207 0.199 … 
                     
Mean 46.820 15.060 11.755 56.801 0.340 16172.100 30.588 1.281 4.993 2.083 0.180 0.480 0.340 3138.920 0.503 0.480 0.902 11.940 2.200 0.460 
SD 33.180 1.020 1.163 20.586 0.479 16161.350 17.696 0.578 2.547 0.988 0.388 0.505 0.479 906.932 0.124 0.505 0.076 20.406 2.060 0.503 
N=48, HI and AK missing                   
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